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Abstract 
Kerr ([1998]) coined the term ‘HARKing’ to refer to the practice of ‘hypothesizing after 
the results are known’. This questionable research practice has received increased attention 
in recent years because it is thought to have contributed to low replication rates in science. 
The present article discusses the concept of HARKing from a philosophical standpoint and 
then undertakes a critical review of Kerr’s ([1998]) twelve potential costs of HARKing. It 
is argued that these potential costs are either misconceived, misattributed to HARKing, 
lacking evidence, or that they do not take into account pre- and post-publication peer 
review and public availability to research materials and data. It is concluded that it is 
premature to assume that HARKing has led to low replication rates. 
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1 Introduction 
Kerr ([1998]) coined the term ‘HARKing’ to refer to the practice of ‘hypothesizing after 
the results are known’. As he explained, ‘HARKing may be defined as presenting a post hoc 
hypothesis in the introduction of a research report as if it were an a priori hypothesis’ (p. 197). 
HARKing may also involve failing to disclose an a priori hypothesis in a research report. 
Kerr’s ([1998]) article has experienced a large increase in citations over the last few years 
(see also Rubin [2017b], Figure 1). Based on data from Google Scholar, the average annual citation 
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rate for Kerr’s article during the period of 2000–2010 was 5.2 citations per year. However, during 
the following period of 2011–2018, this citation rate increased to 75.1 citations per year, and in 
the period of 2017–2018, it was 155.5 citations per year. As Rubin ([2017b]) noted, this dramatic 
increase in citations to Kerr’s article may be because HARKing is regarded as a ‘questionable 
research practice’ (John, Loewenstein, and Prelec [2012]), and questionable research practices are 
thought to be one of the causes of low replication rates in science (for example, Mazzola and 
Deuling [2013]; Aguinis, Cascio, and Ramani [2017]; Hollenbeck and Wright [2017]). 
Given the increased attention to the concept of HARKing, and its potential implication for 
replicability, it is important to understand the nuances and complexities of this questionable 
research practice. In this context, some commentators have considered the conditions under which 
it might be appropriate and inappropriate to engage in HARKing (Leung [2011]; Rubin [2017b]; 
Vancouver [2018]). Rubin ([2017b]) distinguished between three different types of HARKing: (1) 
constructing hypotheses after the results are known (CHARKing), (2) retrieving hypotheses word-
for-word from published literature after the results are known (RHARKing), and (3) suppressing 
a priori hypotheses after the results are known (SHARKing). I concluded that it is never acceptable 
to CHARK, always acceptable to RHARK, and only acceptable to SHARK if the suppressed 
hypotheses are both poorly tested and unrelated to the research conclusions. Vancouver ([2018]) 
and Leung ([2011]) agreed that SHARKing is acceptable if the suppressed hypotheses are 
unrelated to the research conclusions. Vancouver ([2018], p. 78) also proposed that CHARKing is 
acceptable ‘if revised logic and evidence for a set of hypotheses are sound and the method allows 
for the elimination of most of the alternative explanations’. However, he qualified that HARKing 
may not be appropriate under these conditions if the study is investigating a predictor’s validity 
or, potentially, an intervention. 
Rubin ([2017b]), Vancouver ([2018]), and Leung ([2011]) have opened up an important 
discussion about when HARKing may be appropriate and inappropriate. However, they did not 
provide a detailed consideration of the potential costs of HARKing. Kerr ([1998], p. 211) detailed 
twelve potential costs: 
 
1. Translating Type I errors into hard-to-eradicate theory 
2. Propounding theories that cannot (pending replication) pass Popper’s disconfirmability test 
3. Disguising post hoc explanations as a priori explanations (when the former tend also be [sic] 
more ad hoc, and consequently, less useful) 
4. Not communicating valuable information about what did not work 
5. Taking unjustified statistical licence 
6. Presenting an inaccurate model of science to students 
7. Encouraging ‘fudging’ in other grey areas 
8. Making us less receptive to serendipitous findings 
9. Encouraging adoption of narrow, context-bound new theory 
10. Encouraging retention of too-broad, disconfirmable old theory 
11. Inhibiting identification of plausible alternative hypotheses 
12. Implicitly violating basic ethical principles 
 
No prior work has provided a critical evaluation of these twelve potential costs of 
HARKing. It is important to undertake this critical evaluation in order to understand the risks 
involved in HARKing and the potential role of HARKing in relation to replicability and scientific 
progress more broadly. 
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The current article is divided into two main sections. The first section provides a discussion 
about how scientists evaluate hypotheses, and it then considers how HARKing might affect 
hypothesis evaluation. The second section provides a critical review of Kerr’s ([1998]) twelve 
costs of HARKing. 
 
 
2 Hypothesis Evaluation and HARKing 
 
2.1 Hypothesis evaluation 
Scientists do not make absolute, dichotomous judgements about theories and hypotheses 
being ‘true’ or ‘false’. Instead, they make relative, continuous judgements about theories and 
hypotheses being more or less true that other theories and hypotheses in accounting for certain 
phenomena. This process of ‘inference to the best explanation’ (for example, Mackonis [2013]) 
involves researchers and their readers judging which theories and hypotheses are ‘truer’ than other 
theories and hypotheses. Judgements about the relative truth-likeness of theories and hypotheses 
can be described as ‘estimated relative verisimilitude’ (Popper [1985], p. 58; Meehl [1990]; 
Cevolani and Festa [2018]). 
The concept of verisimilitude faces the epistemic problem of estimating an unknown 
quantity: the truth! Nonetheless, as Meehl ([2004], p. 626) observed, practicing scientists often 
speak of improving their theories and of favouring one imperfect theory over another. Hence, 
notwithstanding this epistemic problem, scientists do make estimates of what they perceive to be 
the relative verisimilitude of theories and hypotheses. Furthermore, recent conceptualizations of 
verisimilitude have attempted to overcome its epistemic problem by redefining it as an inextricable 
mix of truth-likeness and informativeness (Cevolani and Festa [2018]). 
During the research process, the estimated relative verisimilitude of a hypothesis is based 
on two sources of information. The first source is the deduction of the hypothesis from a priori 
theory and evidence. This ‘theoretical rationale’ can be used to make an initial estimate of the 
verisimilitude of the hypothesis relative to other hypotheses. The theory and theoretical rationale 
may be judged in terms of several ‘theoretical virtues’ (for example, Ladyman [2002], p. 181; 
Mackonis [2013], p. 978). For example, Mackonis ([2013]) described four theoretical virtues. 
‘Coherence’ refers to the consistency of the theoretical rationale with the primary theory, 
background theories and knowledge, meta-theories, and prior evidence, and it provides an 
indication of the theoretical plausibility of the hypothesis. Note that a theoretical rationale that is 
inconsistent with the theory from which it is purported to be derived will lack coherence. ‘Breadth’ 
indicates the extent to which a theoretical rationale might explain a wide variety of effects, and it 
relates to the predictive informativeness and explanatory power of a hypothesis. ‘Depth’ indicates 
the extent to which a theoretical rationale has the potential to provide a fundamental account of 
explanatory mechanisms. Finally, ‘parsimony’ indicates a theoretical rationale’s efficiency in 
explaining an effect with the smallest number of explanatory constructs (causes, assumptions, 
principles, and so on). All other things being equal, theories and theoretical rationales that are 
coherent, broad, deep, and parsimonious will produce hypotheses that have higher estimated 
verisimilitude than theories and rationales that are incoherent, narrow, shallow, and complex. 
Note that an initial estimate of relative verisimilitude does not need to be a formal 
quantitative estimate (for example, a Bayesian prior probability distribution). It can be as simple 
and informal as a belief about the theory and hypothesis relative to other competing theories and 
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hypotheses (for example, ‘All things considered, I think that this theory and hypothesis has greater 
verisimilitude than these other theories and hypotheses’). 
The second source of information that is used to make judgements about the relative 
verisimilitude of a hypothesis is the relative degree of consistency between the hypothesis and the 
current result. Here, we are interested in the extent to which the hypothesis is more or less 
consistent with the current result compared to other relevant hypotheses. These other hypotheses 
include auxiliary hypotheses about the reliability and validity of the research design and 
measurements. Hence, judgements of relative verisimilitude take into account what Mayo ([1996], 
[2018]) terms the ‘severity’ of the test. All other things being equal, if low quality research design 
and measures cannot explain the current result, and all other relevant alternative hypotheses are 
less consistent with the current result than the primary hypothesis, then the primary hypothesis will 
be judged as being relatively verisimilar. 
Researchers and readers of research reports use information about the current result to 
make changes to their initial estimate of the relative verisimilitude of a hypothesis. An initial 
estimate of the relative verisimilitude is based on the coherence, breadth, depth, and parsimony of 
the theoretical rationale for the hypothesis. This estimate is then updated with information about 
the relative consistency between the hypothesis and the current result relative to other relevant 
hypotheses. The outcome is an increase or decrease in the estimated relative verisimilitude of the 
hypothesis and its associated theory. 
Importantly, according to the principle of ‘use novelty’ (Worrall [1985], [2014]; see also 
Musgrave [1974]; Mayo [1996], [2008]; Rubin [2017b]), a current result can only be used to 
change the initial estimate of relative verisimilitude if that result has not already been used as the 
basis for that initial estimate. If a current result has been used to generate an initial estimate of the 
relative verisimilitude of a hypothesis, then, logically, it cannot be used again to increase or 
decrease that estimate. This approach would represent ‘double counting’ (Mayo [2008]). 
The use novelty principle implies an important distinction between ‘prediction’, in which 
hypotheses are deduced from a priori theory and evidence, and ‘accommodation’, in which 
hypotheses are induced from current results. In the absence of any other information, only 
prediction meets the use novelty principle because only prediction allows researchers and readers 
to derive an estimate of relative verisimilitude from a source that is separate from the current result 
(namely, a priori theory and evidence). In contrast, accommodation violates the use novelty 
principle because it uses the current result as the basis for an initial estimate of relative 
verisimilitude. 
 
2.2 HARKing 
A key criticism of HARKing is that it represents accommodation and, consequently, it 
violates the use novelty principle (for example, Kerr [1998], p. 206). However, HARKing is more 
likely to take the form of ‘post hoc prediction’ than ad hoc accommodation and, consequently, it 
is consistent with the use novelty principle. 
To explain, HARKers are obliged to present a theoretical rationale for their HARKed 
hypothesis in the Introduction section of their research report (Kerr [1998], p. 197). In this 
theoretical rationale, HARKers usually explain how they deduced their hypothesis from a priori 
theory and evidence, and they include citations and references to this theory and evidence. Despite 
its post hoc generation, researchers and readers can use this theoretical rationale to make an initial 
estimate of the relative verisimilitude of the HARKed hypothesis independent from the current 
research result. They can then make a valid update of this estimate based on the current result 
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without violating the use novelty principle. Hence, a HARKer’s post hoc theoretical rationale 
provides the basis for an initial estimate of the relative verisimilitude of the hypothesis, and the 
current result provides a second, independent basis for increasing or decreasing this initial estimate 
(for a similar view, see Oberauer and Lewandowsky [2019]). 
This approach to estimating the relative verisimilitude of a hypothesis with and without 
information provided by the current result is best characterized as the test of a post hoc prediction 
that has been deduced from a priori theory and evidence rather than as the generation of an ad hoc 
accommodation that has been induced from the current result. Importantly, this test remains valid 
even if readers have been misled about when the theoretical rationale was developed (that is, after 
rather than before the researcher knew the current result). 
Critics might question whether post hoc prediction really adheres to the use novelty 
principle. Surely, if a current result motivates and/or guides the construction of a hypothesis, then 
it forfeits its use novelty with respect to that hypothesis? However, this question assumes that 
information that motivates or guides the construction of a hypothesis is also necessary for the 
initial (pre-result) evaluation of that hypothesis. Contrary to this assumption, if a hypothesis can 
be deduced from a priori theory and evidence, then an initial estimate of the hypothesis’ relative 
verisimilitude can be based on this deduction, and information from the current result is not 
necessary to make this initial estimate. Consequently, although a current result may influence the 
construction of a hypothesis, the current result can be considered to be ‘epistemically independent’ 
from that hypothesis if it is not required in order to make an initial estimate of the hypothesis’ 
relative verisimilitude. For example, if the story is to be believed, a falling apple motivated and 
guided Newton’s construction of the theory of gravity. Nonetheless, from a use novelty 
perspective, that same falling apple is not necessary in order to make an initial estimate of the 
relative verisimilitude of Newton’s theory. Consequently, the result represented by that particular 
falling apple may be used to increase support for Newton’s theory if an initial estimate of the 
relative verisimilitude of that theory is based on a priori theory and evidence that excludes that 
result. In summary, a current result may inspire a search for a hypothesis that is consistent with 
that result, and it may even guide the construction of that hypothesis, but neither of these points 
prevent the information about the result from being excluded from an initial estimate of the relative 
verisimilitude of that hypothesis and then being used to change that estimate. 
To illustrate, imagine that a researcher performs a study in which university students are 
randomly assigned to eat an apple every day for a week or, in a control condition, not to eat any 
apples during that week. The researcher then measures a variety of different outcome variables 
and finds that participants who eat an apple every day show a significant improvement in their 
mood compared to participants in the control condition. Further imagine that this result motivates 
the researcher to construct a hypothesis that is consistent with this result. After searching the 
literature, the researcher finds that (a) a priori theory predicts that ‘Vitamin C improves mood’, 
and (b) a priori evidence shows that ‘apples are rich in Vitamin C’. Combining this a priori theory 
and evidence, the researcher deduces the hypothesis that ‘eating apples improve mood’. They then 
explain this reasoning in the Introduction section of their research report, together with relevant 
citations and references to the a priori theory and evidence that they have used. However, they do 
not disclose the timing of their hypothesis construction (that is, after they knew the current result). 
Given that the researcher explains their hypothesis in the Introduction of their research report, 
readers may incorrectly assume that the hypothesis was constructed before the researcher knew 
the research result. Despite this incorrect assumption, and the undisclosed fact that the current 
result motivated a search for the hypothesis, the researcher and their readers can make an initial 
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estimate about the verisimilitude of the hypothesis that ‘eating apples improve mood’ based on the 
theoretical rationale that is presented in the research report, which is itself based on a priori theory 
and evidence regarding Vitamin C, mood, and the Vitamin C content of apples. Critically, readers 
can estimate the relative verisimilitude of the hypothesis (a) without taking the current result into 
account and (b) after taking the current result into account, even if they have been misled about 
when the researcher constructed the hypothesis. Hence, they are able to undertake a valid 
evaluation of the hypothesis even though HARKing has occurred. 
The above conception of HARKing is inspired by Bayesian hypothesis testing. Notably, 
Kerr ([1998], p. 206) considered a similar Bayesian approach in his article: 
One could, in principle, counterfactually estimate the prior probability of that [post hoc] 
hypothesis being true given knowledge of all evidence available except for those new 
results, and then use Bayes’s theorem to estimate how much belief now to place in the new 
hypothesis in light of the new results (i.e., the posterior probability). 
Similar to Kerr ([1998]), I assume that researchers and readers can use a priori theory and evidence 
to estimate the relative verisimilitude (prior probability) of a HARKed hypothesis separate from 
the new results. They can then use the new results to support the HARKed hypothesis (that is, 
increase its estimated relative verisimilitude or posterior probability). The Bayesian perspective 
on this process of ‘counterfactual updating’ is described in detail by Howson ([1984], [1985]; see 
also Howson and Urbach [1993], pp. 403–8). 
Kerr ([1998], p. 206) discussed this Bayesian approach to HARKing when comparing the 
concepts of accommodation and prediction. However, Kerr’s Bayesian approach does not actually 
contrast accommodation with prediction. In the Bayesian case, accommodation would occur if the 
new results were used to estimate the prior probability of the hypothesis. This use of the new results 
to form ‘data-dependent’ or ‘empirical priors’ makes the results logically ineligible as a basis for 
updating the prior probability to compute a posterior probability. As Berger ([2006], p. 399) noted, 
the use of such empirical priors ‘results in an undesirable double use of the data’. In other words, 
it violates the use novelty principle. Critically, however, Kerr’s Bayesian approach does not 
represent ad hoc inductive accommodation because the prior probability is not estimated on the 
basis of the new results. Instead, the prior probability is estimated on the basis ‘of all evidence 
available except for those new results’ (Kerr [1998], p. 206, my emphasis). Consequently, the use 
novelty principle is not violated, and it is legitimate to use the new results to update the prior 
probability to compute the posterior probability. 
Kerr’s ([1998]) Bayesian approach serves to contrast two forms of deductive prediction: 
(a) ‘a priori prediction’ based on a priori theory and evidence and (b) ‘post hoc prediction’ based 
on a priori theory and evidence. The only difference between a priori and post hoc prediction is 
the timing at which the researcher deduces the prediction. A priori predictions are deduced before 
the researcher knows the current result, and post hoc predictions are deduced after the researcher 
knows the current result. In contrast, ad hoc accommodation is always induced on the basis on the 
current result. 
Kerr ([1998], pp. 206–7) dismissed the Bayesian approach to HARKing because he felt 
that it was susceptible to the hindsight bias and other similar biases. In particular, he concluded 
that ‘reconstructing unbiased prior probabilities after one knows the result may be difficult or even 
impossible’ ([1998], p. 207). Certainly, the hindsight and other biases may alter a researcher’s 
subjective feelings about the prior probability of the associated hypothesis, and, if the researcher’s 
estimated prior probability is based on these subjective feelings, then the hindsight and other biases 
may affect this estimate and the updating process (namely, double counting). However, scientists 
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are usually required to provide a transparent and objectively verifiable explanation to support their 
beliefs about a hypothesis (Gelman and Hennig [2017]). Even Bayesian ‘subjective’ priors need 
to have some reasonable, objectively verifiable basis that is independent from the current result 
(for example, meta-analytic evidence, a survey of expert opinion, and so on; Van de Schoot et al. 
[2014], pp. 845, 857; Gelman and Hennig [2017], pp. 974–6). Hence, although the hindsight bias 
may secretly affect researchers’ private prior probabilities, it cannot secretly affect their public 
scientific prior probabilities, because the reasoning that is used to construct public prior 
probabilities is made objectively verifiable. Importantly, it is these public scientific prior 
probabilities that are used during hypothesis evaluation. 
Of course, the hindsight bias may secretly motivate and guide researchers’ selection, 
interpretation, and combination of a priori theory and evidence that they use to deduce a 
hypothesis. Nonetheless, readers will remain able to make an initial estimate of the relative 
verisimilitude of the researcher’s hypothesis independent from the current result and to update that 
estimate with information about the relative consistency between the hypothesis and the result. 
Again, Newton may have constructed his theory of gravity in hindsight, after the apple fell on his 
head. But this hindsight bias does not prevent readers from making an initial estimate of the relative 
verisimilitude of Newton’s theory of gravity based on a priori theory and evidence that omits that 
particular falling apple and then updating their estimate with knowledge of that falling apple. 
 
 
3 A Critical Review of Kerr’s Twelve Costs of Harking 
 
3.1 Cost 1: Translating Type I errors into theory 
Kerr’s ([1998]) first potential cost of HARKing is that it may translate Type I errors into 
hard-to-eradicate theory. In particular, Kerr was concerned about the potential implications of 
HARKing after a Type I error has been made. As he explained, ‘when such a Type I error is 
followed by HARKing, then “theory” is constructed to account for what is, in fact, an illusory 
effect’ (p. 205). Of course, both a priori and post hoc hypotheses may account for illusory effects. 
Hence, Kerr ([1998], p. 205) asked ‘are the costs of making such an error any greater when an 
author has HARKed than under other circumstances?’. He suspected so, arguing that 
[…] an explicitly post hoc hypothesis implicitly acknowledges its dependence upon the 
result in hand as a cornerstone (or perhaps, the entirety) of its foundation, and thereby 
sensitizes the reader to the vulnerability of the hypothesis to the risks of an immediate Type 
I error. (p. 205) 
Kerr is concerned about overfitting here (for example, Hitchcock and Sober [2004]; see also Kerr 
[1998], pp. 206–7). Overfitting occurs when a hypothesis is constructed in order to accommodate 
a collection of current results, some of which are representative of the population and some of 
which are spurious Type I errors that are specific to the particular sample in hand. In this case, the 
relative verisimilitude of the hypothesis will be overestimated because false positive results will 
be mistaken for true positive results (that is, Type I errors). This overestimation of relative 
verisimilitude will be greater when the sample is less representative of the population (for example, 
when the sample is smaller and/or less randomly selected from the population). 
Although overfitting is a problem for ad hoc accommodation, it is not a problem in the 
case of HARKing that uses post hoc prediction. In this latter case, researchers and readers base 
their initial judgement of relative verisimilitude on a theoretical rationale that is deduced from a 
priori theory and evidence. Consequently, their initial estimate of relative verisimilitude is not 
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based on the current results (including spurious, sample-specific Type I errors), and so no 
overfitting can occur. 
Critics might argue that HARKing allows researchers to deduce a potentially infinite 
number of hypotheses from a priori theory and evidence, and that these hypotheses can then be 
used to fit any collection of current results (for example, Kerr [1998], p. 210). This is true. 
However, this criticism refers to ‘flexible theorizing’ rather than overfitting, and the concern about 
flexible theorizing is mitigated by the fact that science progresses via inference to the ‘best’ 
explanation rather than inference to ‘any’ explanation. Researchers and readers do not ask 
‘whether’ a current result can be explained but rather ‘how well’ it can be explained. Consequently, 
if flexible theorizing leads to a low quality theoretical rationale (that is, incoherent, narrow, 
shallow, and complex), then the associated hypothesis will be negatively evaluated as having 
relatively low verisimilitude even if it has a relatively high degree of consistency with the current 
results (for a related discussion, see Szollosi and Donkin [2019]). Importantly, readers are able to 
identify deficiencies in the quality of a theoretical rationale, as presented in a research report, even 
if they are misled about when that rationale was developed. Hence, although flexible theorizing 
may occur during HARKing, readers can identify any associated low quality theorizing and take 
this into account in their estimates of relative verisimilitude. 
Kerr ([1998]) also associated HARKing with data snooping in large data sets without 
appropriate experimentwise Type I error rate protection. There are two issues to consider here. 
First, researchers are unlikely to be interested in the experimentwise error rate unless they are 
interested in the experimentwise null hypothesis, and they are unlikely to be interested in the 
experimentwise null hypothesis in experiments that include multiple theoretically unrelated tests 
(for similar views, see Rothman [1990]; Savitz and Olshan [1995]; Cook and Farewell [1996], pp. 
101–2; Perneger [1998]; Bender and Lange [2001]; Hewes [2003]; O’Keefe [2003]; Schulz and 
Grimes [2005]; Matsunaga [2007]; Morgan [2007]; Rothman, Greenland, and Lash [2008]; 
Parascandola [2010]; Hurlbert and Lombardi [2012]; Armstrong [2014]; Rubin [2017a], p. 271). 
For example, imagine a study that investigates differences in mathematics performance as a 
function of participants’ gender, age, and social class. In this case, the two-sided experimentwise 
joint null hypothesis would be that ‘men, older adults, and people from a lower social class 
background do not have either better or worse mathematics performance than women, younger 
adults, and people from a higher social class background, respectively’. If researchers undertake 
union-intersection testing (Kim et al. [2004]), then they will reject this experimentwise null 
hypothesis if any one of the three constituent two-sided tests yields a significant result. It is this 
‘multiple testing’ issue that provides the rationale for lowering the significance threshold. For 
example, a Bonferroni correction would lower the conventional two-sided significance threshold 
from 0.050 to 0.016 in the case of the mathematics study (that is, 0.050/3 tests). Critically, 
however, even if gender, age, and social class are all expected to affect mathematics performance, 
the theoretical reasons for these associations will be different in each case (for example, gender 
stereotyping in the case of gender, cognitive ability in the case of age, and education levels in the 
case of social class). Consequently, it would be inappropriate to treat these three demographic 
variables as theoretically exchangeable predictors of mathematics performance, which is how they 
would be treated if a significant result for ‘any one’ of them was sufficient to reject the 
experimentwise null hypothesis. As a result, researchers should not be interested in testing 
theoretically impotent experimentwise null hypotheses or in computing associated experimentwise 
error rates. Instead, they should be more interested in testing theoretically meaningful (one-sided) 
individual null hypotheses (for example, ‘men do not perform better than women in mathematics’) 
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and theoretically meaningful (one-sided) joint null hypotheses (for example, ‘men do not perform 
better than women in either (a) algebra or (b) calculus’). Note that the alpha level for individual 
tests of individual hypotheses does not require an adjustment, even if many such tests are 
performed within the same experiment (Tukey [1953]; Savitz and Olshan [1995], p. 906; Cook 
and Farewell [1996]; Matsunaga [2007]; Hurlbert and Lombardi [2012]; Rubin [2017a]). 
Second, failing to disclose the timing of the construction of a HARKed but theoretically 
meaningful joint null hypothesis is a separate issue from failing to disclose the multiple testing of 
that hypothesis. Hence, a researcher can HARK a theoretically meaningful joint null hypothesis 
(for example, ‘gender is not associated with performance in either (a) algebra or (b) calculus’) and 
then transparently disclose and adjust for each of the multiple tests of this hypothesis (for example, 
using a significance threshold of 0.025 instead of 0.050). Mayo ([1996], p. 312) might describe 
this researcher as an ‘honest hunter’ because, although the timing of the hypothesis construction 
has been concealed (HARKing), the multiple testing has been disclosed and the significance 
threshold has been lowered accordingly. Note that the practice of making research materials and 
data publically available assists with the detection of any undisclosed multiple testing of joint null 
hypotheses (Rubin [2017a], p. 273). 
 
3.2 Cost 2: Failing Popper’s criterion of disconfirmability 
Cost 2 is that HARKing propounds theories that cannot (pending replication) pass Popper’s 
disconfirmability test. Specifically, Kerr ([1998]) argued that ‘any hypothesis that could never fail 
(to be confirmed) can never succeed (as a scientifically testable explanation). A HARKed 
hypothesis fails this criterion, at least in a narrow, temporal sense’ ([1998], pp. 205–6; see also 
Leung [2011], p. 475). However, as Kerr ([1998], p. 198) later discussed in relation to Cost 11, 
researchers can construct ‘one or more hypotheses known post hoc to be contradicted by the data’. 
Hence, contrary to Kerr’s Cost 2 assumption, it is possible to HARK a disconfirmed hypothesis. 
Rubin ([2017b], p. 318) considered HARKed disconfirmations and proposed that they were 
acceptable for RHARKed hypotheses but not for CHARKed hypotheses, because ‘CHARKed 
hypotheses lack independence from the observed evidence’. However, elsewhere in this article, I 
argued that ‘in cases in which researchers hypothesize after the results are known but not on the 
basis of those results, use novelty is preserved, prediction and falsification are possible, and there 
is no detriment to scientific progress’ ([2017b], p. 312). Hence, Rubin ([2017b]) had an 
inconsistent position on this issue. The concern that ‘CHARKed hypotheses lack independence 
from the observed evidence’ (p. 318) did not consider the concept of epistemic independence, and 
it confounded hypothesis construction with hypothesis evaluation. 
Contrary to Kerr ([1998]) and Rubin ([2017b]), HARKed hypotheses pass Popper’s 
disconfirmability test. To explain, it is necessary to understand Popper’s views on falsifiability. 
Popper was concerned with a ‘logical asymmetry’ between verification and falsification (Earp and 
Trafimow [2015], p. 6). His critical argument is that ‘a set of singular observation 
statements[…]may at times falsify or refute a universal law; but it cannot possibly verify a law, in 
the sense of establishing it’ (Popper [1985], p. 181). So, for example, repeatedly observing black 
swans (a set of singular observations) may falsify the substantive hypothesis (universal law) that 
‘all swans are white’ via the logical syllogism of modus tollens: If all swans are white, then no 
black swans should be observed. Black swans are observed. Therefore, not all swans are white. In 
contrast, the repeated observation of black swans cannot verify or confirm the substantive 
hypothesis that ‘all swans are black’. If all swans are black, then black swans should be observed. 
Black swans are observed. However, these observations do not confirm that all swans are black. It 
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could be that only some swans are black, and we have sampled those black swans in our 
observations. We would be making the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent if we were to 
argue that we had verified that ‘all swans are black’ based on our observations. The problem of 
induction means that it is impossible to exhaustively test and confirm (verify) the universal law 
that ‘all swans are black’. 
A key implication of Popper’s logical asymmetry between falsification and verification is 
that researchers should attempt to falsify substantive null hypotheses (universal laws) in order to 
provide piecemeal support for corresponding substantive alternative hypotheses. However, Popper 
conceded that these attempted falsifications could never be certain due to the problem of 
underdetermination (for a discussion, see Earp and Trafimow [2015]). In particular, it is not 
possible to falsify a substantive null hypothesis conclusively because it is always possible for this 
hypothesis to be true and for the observed research results to be explained by the falsity of some 
other (auxiliary) substantive hypothesis (for example, the hypothesis that the measuring 
instruments are valid; Earp and Trafimow [2015], p. 7). As Popper ([1985], p. 186) put it, ‘we may 
have made a mistake’. Hence, observing several black swans only falsifies the substantive null 
hypothesis that ‘all swans are white’ if we have not made a mistake in defining and measuring the 
blackness and swanness of the birds that we observed. Give this problem of underdetermination, 
Popper distinguished between two senses of falsification: the logical sense and the practical sense 
(‘naïve falsification’; Popper [1985], pp. xxxiv–v). As he explained,  
I have always stressed that even a theory which is obviously falsifiable in the first sense is 
never falsifiable in this second sense….Although the first sense refers to the logical 
possibility of a falsification in principle, the second sense refers to a conclusive practical 
experimental proof of falsity. But anything like conclusive proof to settle an empirical 
question does not exist (Popper [1985], p. xxii). 
Despite Popper’s clarifications on this point, Kerr’s ([1998]) Popperian critique of 
HARKing is based on conclusive practical falsification rather than logical falsification. Hence, 
Kerr argued that, ‘when the investigator knows the results of the study in advance and HARKs a 
hypothesis consistent with those results, no immediate possibility of disconfirmation exists’ (p. 
206, my emphasis). However, even Popper conceded that ‘conclusive practical experimental proof 
of falsity’ is impossible, because ‘we may have made a mistake’ (Popper [1985], p. xxii, p. 186; 
see also Earp and Trafimow [2015]). Hence, although Kerr’s ([1998]) point is correct, it is correct 
for both HARKed and non-HARKed hypotheses. Consequently, it does not serve as a useful 
criticism of HARKing. HARKed hypotheses can never be conclusively disconfirmed, but neither 
can non-HARKed hypotheses. 
To be fair, Kerr ([1998]) was aware of his oversimplification of Popper’s position. As he 
explained, ‘because either theories or research findings can be equivocal, certain hypotheses can 
be neither indisputably consistent nor inconsistent with the results in hand’ (p. 197). However, he 
continued ‘but for the present purposes, let us assume a simpler, more definitive world’ (p. 197). 
The problem is that researchers and their readers do not live in this simpler, more definite world 
of naïve falsification (Popper [1985], pp. xxxiv–v). They live in a world in which the problem of 
underdetermination makes it impossible for a research finding to falsify a hypothesis conclusively. 
Ignoring this point does not provide a valid basis for making realistic claims about the costs of 
HARKing. 
It is important to note that HARKing does not preclude Popper’s second, more important 
meaning of falsification, which refers to the logical asymmetry between falsifiability and 
verifiability. This asymmetry is based on the content of hypotheses, rather than the timing of their 
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construction. For example, the hypothesis that ‘all swans are white’ is logically falsifiable, whereas 
the hypothesis that ‘some swans are white’ is not logically falsifiable. This asymmetry persists 
even if these two hypotheses are constructed (a) after knowing the research results and (b) on the 
basis of the research results. Hence, contrary to Kerr ([1998]), HARKing does not propound 
theories or hypotheses that fail to pass Popper’s disconfirmability test. 
 
3.3 Cost 3: Disguising accommodation as prediction 
Cost 3 refers back to readers’ underappreciation of the risk of overfitting when researchers 
disguise accommodation as prediction. However, if the act of disguising accommodation as 
prediction entails the deduction of hypotheses from a priori theory and evidence, then this act 
produces a genuine prediction that precludes the cost of overfitting. To explain, imagine that a 
researcher conducts a study and finds that participants who eat an apple a day report better mood 
than those in a control condition. The researcher may then accommodate this current result by 
inducing the ad hoc hypothesis that ‘eating apples improves mood’. In the absence of any other 
information, the relative verisimilitude of this ad hoc hypothesis can only be estimated on the basis 
of the current result. However, now imagine that the researcher ‘disguises’ this accommodation as 
prediction by explaining in the Introduction section of their research report that (a) a priori theory 
predicts that ‘Vitamin C improves mood’, (b) a priori evidence shows that ‘apples are rich in 
Vitamin C’, and so (c) ‘eating apples should improve mood’. In this case, the act of disguising ad 
hoc accommodation based on a current result as an a priori prediction based on a priori theory 
and evidence provides the researcher and their readers with a new basis for making an initial 
estimate of the relative verisimilitude of the hypothesis that is independent from the current result. 
In turn, this act allows them to use the current result to increase or decrease that initial estimate. 
In summary, Cost 3 assumes that the act of disguising accommodation as prediction hides 
the costs associated with accommodation (namely, double-counting, overfitting). However, if this 
act entails the public deduction of the hypothesis from a priori theory and evidence, then it actually 
eliminates the costs associated with accommodation because it provides a valid independent basis 
for making an initial estimate of the relative verisimilitude of the hypothesis. In effect, the act of 
‘disguising’ accommodation as prediction turns ad hoc accommodation into post hoc prediction. 
 
3.4 Cost 4: Not communicating information about what did not work 
Cost 4 is not communicating valuable information about disconfirmed hypotheses. Indeed, 
as discussed below (Cost 6), there is some evidence that researchers suppress hypotheses that are 
disconfirmed (Mazzola and Deuling [2013]). However, as other commentators have pointed out, 
a key distinction here is between disconfirmed hypotheses that are relevant and irrelevant to the 
research conclusions (Leung [2011]; Rubin [2017b]; Vancouver [2018]). 
Obviously, it is biased for researchers to suppress a priori hypotheses that are relevant to 
their research conclusions. However, this bias is likely to be identified and addressed during two 
stages of peer review. First, if the suppressed hypotheses are obviously relevant to the research 
conclusions, then they are likely to be suggested as alternative explanations during the pre-
publication peer review process (see Cost 11). As Kerr ([1998], p. 208) asked, ‘if one’s original 
hypotheses had a sufficient rationale (theoretical, empirical, or even intuitive) to recommend itself 
to one researcher, why would it not also occur to others?’. Second, if suppressed relevant a priori 
hypotheses are overlooked during pre-publication peer review, then they may be generated by 
interested readers during post-publication peer review. Furthermore, if research materials and data 
are made publically available, then these hypotheses may be tested by interested readers. 
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In contrast to the suppression of a priori hypotheses that are relevant to the research 
conclusions, the suppression of a priori hypotheses that are irrelevant to the research conclusions 
will not bias research conclusions (Leung [2011]; Rubin [2017b]; Vancouver [2018]). 
Nonetheless, Rubin ([2017b], p. 316) argued that even the suppression of irrelevant a priori 
hypotheses can ‘bias information about the size and replicability of effects in meta-analyses’. In 
addition, the suppression of irrelevant a priori hypotheses that yield inconclusive (null) findings 
prevents other researchers from identifying and avoiding nondiagnostic methods in their future 
research. Again, however, making research materials and data publically available helps to 
alleviate these problems. Specifically, readers, meta-analysts, and other researchers may access 
publically available research materials and data in order to formulate and test their own hypotheses. 
For an illustration, please see my use of Janke, Daumiller, and Rudert’s ([2019]) publically 
available research materials and data to test a hypothesis that was irrelevant to Janke et al.’s 
conclusions but relevant to Kerr’s ([1998]) Cost 7 below. 
In summary, the suppression of disconfirmed hypotheses may lead to biased research 
conclusions, missing null results, and/or unreported failed methods. However, these problems are 
reduced through pre- and post-publication peer review and the public availability of research 
materials and data.  
 
3.5 Cost 5: Taking unjustified statistical license 
Cost 5 refers to researchers taking unjustified statistical license, such as using one-tailed 
tests and contrast analyses that are supposed to be based on a priori theory. Certainly, in the 
absence of a theoretical rationale for a hypothesis, a two-sided (nondirectional) test is more 
appropriate than a one-sided test, because the researcher has no reason to predict that the effect 
will be positive or a negative (Cortina and Dunlap [1997], p. 168). However, a one-sided test is 
appropriate if it is accompanied by a theoretical rationale that specifies a directional prediction 
based on a priori theory and evidence (Cortina and Dunlap [1997], p. 168). Importantly, the timing 
of the construction of this theoretical rationale is not relevant. A theoretical rationale may warrant 
a directional test regardless of whether that rationale is constructed before or after a researcher 
conducts the test. For example, imagine that a researcher uses a one-sided test and obtains a 
significant positive correlation (α = 0.050). In the absence of a theoretical rationale, this directional 
test is unwarranted. However, further imagine that the test result inspires the researcher to deduce 
a post hoc hypothesis from a priori theory and evidence that predicts a positive correlation. Now, 
the hypothesis provides a rationale for using the one-sided test. Critics may argue that an alpha 
adjustment is required in this case (for example, α = 0.025) because the researcher could have 
conducted two one-sided tests: one to test for a positive correlation and the other to test for a 
negative correlation. However, the researcher’s hypothesis only makes a single, directional, one-
sided prediction about the presence of a positive correlation (and, consequently, the absence of a 
negative correlation). It does not make a joint, bidirectional, two-sided prediction about the 
presence of either a positive or a negative correlation. Consequently, it does not warrant a union-
intersection test of the joint null hypothesis of ‘no positive or negative correlation’ (Cortina and 
Dunlap [1997], p. 168; Kim et al. [2004]), and no alpha adjustment for the familywise error rate 
of this joint hypothesis is required, because this hypothesis is not being tested. 
Similarly, a HARKed hypothesis may predict a specific pattern of results that can be tested 
using contrast analyses. Again, the statistical license for these analyses is the theoretical rationale 
for the hypothesis, as explained in the research report. This license does not become unjustified 
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merely because the theoretical rationale was conceived after the researcher knew the test result. 
Instead, it becomes unjustified if there is no theoretical rationale for the directional prediction. 
In summary, researchers who present a theoretical rationale for a hypothesis based on a 
priori theory and evidence are justified in using statistical tests that assess the directional 
predictions made by that hypothesis regardless of whether that rationale was developed before or 
after the test result was known to them. 
 
3.6 Cost 6: Presenting an inaccurate model of science 
Cost 6 is presenting an inaccurate and distorted model of science to students. In particular, 
Kerr ([1998], p. 208) argued that HARKing presents a ‘too-rosy picture’ of how science normally 
proceeds because it gives the impression that researchers are usually correct in their predictions. 
However, Cost 6 is caused by ‘publication bias’ rather than HARKing. In particular, Cost 6 arises 
because, all other things being equal, professional research journals tend to favour the publication 
of significant results and reject the publication of nonsignificant null findings. HARKing arises as 
a consequence of this publication bias: Researchers suppress a priori hypotheses that are 
associated with nonsignificant results and HARK hypotheses that fit significant results. Consistent 
with this view, in a survey of 156 behavioural scientists, Kerr and Harris ([1998], as cited in Kerr 
[1998], p. 202) found that respondents believed that a HARKed article had a greater chance of 
publication than a non-HARKed article. A more recent study by Mazzola and Deuling ([2013]) 
reinforced the idea that publication bias causes HARKing. These researchers analysed 215 
published journal articles and 127 unpublished PhD dissertations in the area of industrial and 
organizational psychology during the period 2010–2012. They found a significantly higher 
percentage of supported hypotheses and a significantly lower percentage of unsupported 
hypotheses in the published journal articles compared to the unpublished PhD dissertations. Hence, 
it appears that researchers’ awareness of publication bias caused them to HARK when writing 
journal articles. 
Eliminating HARKing would not eliminate the publication bias that lies behind it. If 
researchers did not HARK, then their null findings would continue to be rejected by journals for 
publication, and these journals would continue to present a distorted ‘too-rosy picture’ of science. 
The way to address this distorted view is to address publication bias, not HARKing. 
It is also important to educate students and researchers about HARKing and the conditions 
under which it may and may not be appropriate (see also Kerr [1998], p. 214; Rubin [2017b], p. 
311). In particular, it is important to understand the potential meanings of phrases such as ‘we 
predicted that’ and ‘as hypothesized’. A common interpretation of these phrases is that they imply 
that researchers constructed their hypothesis before they observed their research results. However, 
as explained earlier, phrases such as these may also denote post hoc predictions that researchers 
have deduced from a priori theory and evidence (Worrall [1985], [2014]; Rubin [2017b], p. 311). 
Under this latter interpretation, the phrase ‘we hypothesized that…’ retains its scientific meaning 
in ‘the epistemically important sense’ (Worrall [2014], p. 55) even if researchers constructed their 
hypotheses after observing their current results. 
Finally, it is important to appreciate the epistemic source of predictions. Again, the 
common view is that researchers, rather than hypotheses, do the predicting. However, this view is 
misleading because we should be more interested in the predictive accuracy of hypotheses than of 
researchers. In other words, we should be concerned about ‘hypothesis testing’ than ‘researcher 
testing’. As Vancouver ([2018], p. 77) explained, 
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the hypothesis is not about the author. It is about the theory or arguments brought to bear 
to the research question constrained by the methods used to test the theory. These theories 
or arguments might be brought to bear after the results are known; but, regardless of order, 
the hypotheses follow from these arguments, and that is how to state it (e.g., ‘this leads to 
the following hypothesis’). 
 
3.7 Cost 7: Encouraging ‘fudging’ in other grey areas 
Cost 7 is the encouragement of ‘fudging’ in other grey areas. Kerr ([1998], pp. 209–10) 
explained that ‘HARKing may fall into that grey area of “questionable scientific practices” where 
the line between clearly appropriate and clearly inappropriate behavior is indistinct’. Consistent 
with this view, John, Loewenstein, and Prelec ([2012]) categorized HARKing as one of ten 
questionable research practices. However, as John, Loewenstein, and Prelec ([2012], p. 531) noted, 
there is a great degree of variability in the ‘questionability’ of these research practices. Some 
research practices may be considered to be acceptable under some conditions (for example, ‘failing 
to report all of a study’s dependent measures’), whereas others are clearly inappropriate under all 
conditions (for example, ‘falsifying data’; for a further discussion, see Pickett and Roche [2018], 
pp. 152–3). 
According to Kerr ([1998], p. 210), Cost 7 is that the informal acceptance of HARKing by 
the scientific community encourages fudging in other grey areas. In particular, the acceptance of 
HARKing by editors and peer reviewers ‘encourages ignoring or blurring other such lines when 
convenient’ and is ‘greasing the slippery slope’ towards the use of inappropriate research practices 
(p. 210). If Kerr’s slippery slope hypothesis is correct, then there should be a positive correlation 
between HARKing and other questionable research practices. To test this prediction, I analysed 
data that was made publically available by Janke, Daumiller, and Rudert ([2019]; 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/1948550618790227). These researchers sampled 
217 German psychology doctoral candidates and postdocs and measured questionable research 
practices using John, Loewenstein, and Prelec’s ([2012]) ten items. The HARKing question was: 
‘How often have you reported an unexpected finding as having been predicted from the start?’ 
Participants responded to this and the other nine items using a five-point scale ranging from ‘never’ 
to ‘very frequently’. The average correlation between HARKing and the other research practices 
was small (r = 0.06). The three highest (and only significant) correlations were between HARKing 
and (a) failing to report all of a study’s dependent measures (r = 0.35), (b) selectively reporting 
studies that ‘worked’ (r = 0.28), and (c) deciding whether to exclude data after looking at the 
impact of doing so on the results (r = 0.26). Note that these three research practices are associated 
with suppressing hypotheses after the results are known, which is a form of HARKing (Kerr 
[1998]; Rubin [2017b]). Hence, there are theoretical grounds for expecting these positive 
correlations. Also, note that each of these research practices are justifiable under certain 
conditions. For example, failing to report all of a study’s dependent measures may not bias the 
research conclusions if the measures yielded results that are irrelevant to the research conclusions 
(see Cost 4) and are presented to participants at the end of a study and so had no chance of affecting 
results from previously presented dependent measures. Similarly, failing to report an entire study 
may not bias the research conclusions if the study produced irrelevant results and/or suffered from 
a fatal flaw (for example, an invalid experimental manipulation or very low sample size) that 
rendered its results inconclusive. Finally, deciding whether to exclude data after looking at the 
impact of doing so on the results may be acceptable if the researcher transparently describes and 
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justifies this approach in their research report and reports any substantive discrepancies in their 
pattern of results when the data is included. 
HARKing had weak and nonsignificant correlations with three other questionable research 
practices, including optional stopping of data collection in order to achieve significant results (rs 
= 0.06 and 0.10) and failing to report all of a study’s conditions (r = 0.01). Importantly, HARKing 
also had weak nonsignificant correlations with research practices that are clearly inappropriate, 
including reporting a p value of 0.054 as p < 0.05 (r = 0.05), claiming results are unaffected by 
demographic variables when one is unsure or knows that they are affected (r = 0.09), and falsifying 
data (r = -0.06). 
In summary, Janke, Daumiller, and Rudert’s ([2019]) data showed limited support for 
Kerr’s ([1998]) slippery slope hypothesis. HARKing was only associated with three out of nine 
questionable, incorrect, or fraudulent research practices, and these three research practices can be 
interpreted as being appropriate under certain conditions. Hence, there is no clear support for the 
idea that HARKing is associated with ‘fudging’ in other areas. 
 
3.8 Cost 8: Making researchers less receptive to serendipitous findings 
Cost 8 is that the current scientific system, with its emphasis on a priori confirmation and 
prediction, may adversely affect scientific discovery by making researchers less receptive to 
serendipitous findings (see also Hollenbeck and Wright [2017], p. 12). As Kerr ([1998]) noted, 
‘this is less a consequence of HARKing per se than of one of its primary causes: insistence on 
confirmation of a priori hypotheses as the only route to new knowledge’ (p. 210). Hence, lack of 
receptivity to serendipitous findings is a cost of the scientific system’s insistence of confirmation 
of a priori hypotheses. It is not a cost of HARKing. Indeed, HARKing is a solution to this problem, 
because it is a means by which researchers can publically report serendipitous findings in a 
scientific system that values a priori prediction over post hoc prediction. 
 
3.9 Cost 9: Encouraging the adoption of narrow, context-bound theory 
Costs 9, 10, and 11 refer to the type of theory development that might occur if HARKing 
was commonplace. Cost 9 is the encouragement of the adoption of narrow, context-bound new 
theory. This cost refers back to Cost 1 (translating Type I errors into theory) and the concern about 
overfitting. As Kerr ([1998], p. 210) explained,  
HARKing may foster preoccupation with explaining an effect in hand with an attendant 
lack of attention to the broader set of potentially relevant prior findings. If HARKing were 
commonplace, much of our new theory would have such a genesis – being developed to 
explain some specific effect observed in some specific experimental context and paradigm. 
Cost 9 assumes that HARKing produces low quality (‘narrow, context-bound’) theoretical 
rationales and hypotheses. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that HARKed hypotheses are 
perceived to be of poorer quality than non-HARKed hypotheses. Indeed, given that HARKing is 
often encouraged by expert peer reviewers (Kerr and Harris [1998], as cited in Kerr [1998]; Leung 
[2011]; Hollenbeck and Wright [2017]; Rubin [2017b]), it may actually improve the quality of 
hypotheses relative to unadulterated a priori hypotheses. 
However, even if HARKing does lower the quality of hypotheses, readers can identify this 
low quality in the theoretical rationale that is presented in the Introduction section of the research 
report and take it into account when making their initial estimates of relative verisimilitude. For 
example, the initial estimated relative verisimilitude of a hypothesis that is based on a narrow, 
context-bound theoretical rationale will be low, and it will remain relatively low after being 
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updated by information from the current result, unless that current result provides particularly 
compelling evidence. 
In summary, HARKing may not necessarily lead to narrow, context-bound theoretical 
rationales. However, if it does, then readers are able to take such low quality theorizing into 
account in their initial estimates of relative verisimilitude. 
 
3.10 Cost 10: Encouraging the retention of too-broad theory 
Cost 10 is the retention of too-broad disconfirmable old theory. As Kerr ([1998], p. 210) 
explained, this includes 
theory with which one can predict nearly any pattern of results in nearly any context. Such 
theory is likely to be vague in its concepts, to incorporate multiple (sometimes opposing) 
processes, and to have many auxiliary assumptions that are not firmly fixed and can be 
used in an ad hoc fashion to accommodate nearly any observation. 
Like Cost 9, Cost 10 assumes that theories are judged in terms of their empirical support 
and not in terms of their theoretical quality. Indeed, at another point in his article, Kerr ([1998]) 
lamented that ‘we trivialize the term theory and overcredit apparent confirmations when we draw 
no distinction between hypotheses derived from poor theory and those from better theory’ (p. 215). 
Certainly, Costs 9 and 10 assume that researchers and their readers trivialize theory and overcredit 
confirmation. But is this characterization correct? Do researchers and readers really fail to 
distinguish between poor theory and better theory? I would argue that they do not. Instead, 
researchers and readers regularly criticize research in terms of the quality of the theoretical ideas, 
referring to theoretical virtues such as coherence, breadth, depth, and parsimony (Ladyman [2002]; 
Meehl [2004]; Mackonis [2013]). Hence, to return to Kerr’s example, a person who perceives a 
theory to be vague in its concepts, to incorporate multiple opposing processes, and to have many 
flexible auxiliary assumptions is likely to regard that theory as being lower in coherence, depth, 
and parsimony than a theory that is well-specified, internally consistent, and less flexible. 
 
3.11 Cost 11: Inhibiting the identification of alternative hypotheses 
Cost 11 is the lack of identification of plausible alternative hypotheses. Specifically, Kerr 
([1998]) argued that researchers tend to consider a confirmed hypothesis to be a correct hypothesis, 
and they do not tend to consider the possibility that other hypotheses might have predicted the 
same result. This ‘satisficing bias’ may apply to both a priori and post hoc hypotheses. However, 
Kerr suggested that it is particularly problematic when researchers HARK, because HARKed 
hypotheses always meet researchers’ expectations, and researchers are less likely to consider 
alternative explanations when their expectations are met. As he explained, ‘HARKing guarantees 
the provision of one or more hypotheses sufficient to account for a result in hand. If readers or the 
investigator himself or herself acted like such satisficers, they would not need to consider 
alternative explanations’ (p. 210). 
Cost 11 does not take into account the realities of the scientific publication system. Editors 
and peer reviewers of research reports often encourage researchers to compare the primary 
explanation for their results with alternative explanations (for example, in the ‘Limitations’ and 
‘Directions for Future Research’ sections of a research report). Furthermore, editors may reject 
reports from publication or request a revision if alternative explanations are not considered. Hence, 
researchers are required to engage in a documented process of inference to the best explanation 
for their results, and this process includes a discussion of alternative explanations. HARKers are 
no less likely to face this requirement than non-HARKers. However, in a system that discourages 
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the publication of post hoc hypothesis testing, HARKers have a greater potential to publish tests 
of alternative explanations, because they are able to disguise post hoc alternative explanations as 
a priori alternative explanations. Hence, contrary to Kerr ([1998]), and in a reversal of Cost 4 
(suppressing relevant a priori hypotheses), HARKing may actually facilitate the publication of 
tests of alternative explanations. 
Kerr ([1998], p. 198) briefly considered this possibility when he mentioned that researchers 
can construct ‘one or more hypotheses known post hoc to be contradicted by the data’. He noted 
that ‘this approach could create an illusion of competitive hypothesis testing’ (p. 198). Here, the 
‘illusion’ refers to the reader’s misguided belief that the researchers were unaware of the outcome 
of the competitive hypothesis test prior to conducting the test. Despite this erroneous belief, the 
competitive hypothesis test facilitates valid estimates of relative verisimilitude in a process of 
inference to the best explanation. For example, if a positive correlation is observed, and a priori 
theory and evidence is then used to independently deduce (a) a post hoc hypothesis that predicts 
this positive correlation and (b) a post hoc hypothesis that predicts a negative correlation, then the 
estimated verisimilitude of the first hypothesis can be increased relative to second.  
 
3.12 Cost 12: Violating the ethical principles of honesty and openness 
Cost 12 refers to the violation of ethical principles. Specifically, Kerr ([1998], p. 209) 
argued that ‘HARKing violates a fundamental ethical principle of science: the obligation to 
communicate one’s work honestly and completely’. However, he provided some nuance to this 
point: ‘HARKing can entail concealment. The question then becomes whether what is concealed 
in HARKing can be a useful part of the “truth” […] or is instead basically uninformative (and may, 
therefore, be safely ignored at an author’s discretion)’ ([1998], p. 209). 
Hence, as a general principle, researchers should be honest and open when reporting their 
research. However, researchers do not need to be honest and open about facts that are ‘basically 
uninformative’ and do not form ‘a useful part of the “truth”’ (Kerr [1998], p. 209). For example, 
it is usually unnecessary for researchers to disclose the colour of the socks that they were wearing 
when they conducted their study! Similarly, as I have argued throughout this article, although the 
epistemic independence between a hypothesis and a current result is ‘a useful part of the “truth”’ 
(Kerr [1998], p. 209), the timing of the construction of the hypothesis is ‘basically uninformative’. 
Hence, concealing the timing of hypothesis construction may not necessarily be regarded as being 
unethical, because it does not prevent an accurate assessment of epistemic independence (for a 
similar view, see Vancouver [2018], pp. 77–8). 
 
 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
What are the costs of harking? Kerr ([1998]) proposed that they are plentiful, and recent 
discussions have argued that they may have led to low replication rates in science (John, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec [2012]; Mazzola and Deuling [2013]; Aguinis, Cascio, and Ramani 
[2017]; Hollenbeck and Wright [2017]). The present article challenges this perspective. Table 1 
provides a summary of Kerr’s ([1998]) twelve costs of HARKing and some responses. 
By definition, HARKing conceals the timing of hypothesizing. However, it does not 
conceal the quality of (a) the hypothesizing, (b) the research methodology, or (c) the statistical 
analysis. Readers can make judgements about the quality of each these aspects of the research 
without knowing the timing of the hypothesizing. In particular, even if readers are unaware that a  
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Table 1 
Kerr’s ([1998]) Twelve Costs of HARKing and Some Responses 
Cost Kerr ([1998]) Response 
1 Translating Type I errors into 
hard-to-eradicate theory. 
The overfitting of post hoc hypotheses to Type I errors is not 
possible when those hypotheses are deduced from a priori theory 
and evidence. Flexible theorizing is possible, but it can be 
identified and taken into account in estimates of relative 
verisimilitude. 
2 Propounding theories that cannot 
(pending replication) pass 
Popper’s disconfirmability test. 
Popper’s disconfirmability test refers to the content of 
hypotheses, not the timing of the construction of those 
hypotheses. HARKed hypotheses can pass this test. 
3 Disguising post hoc explanations 
as a priori explanations (when the 
former tend also be [sic] more ad 
hoc, and consequently, less 
useful). 
Deducing post hoc explanations from a priori theory and 
evidence provides an epistemically independent basis for 
estimating relative verisimilitude that prevents overfitting and 
validates post hoc predictions. 
4 Not communicating valuable 
information about what did not 
work. 
The potential costs associated with biased research conclusions, 
missing null results, and/or unreported failed methods are 
alleviated via pre- and post-publication peer review and the 
public availability of research materials and data. 
5 Taking unjustified statistical 
licence. 
Post hoc theoretical rationales that are deduced from a priori 
theory and evidence can provide valid justifications for 
directional statistical tests. 
6 Presenting an inaccurate model of 
science to students. 
Publication bias presents an inaccurate model of science to 
students. HARKing is only a response to publication bias. 
7 Encouraging ‘fudging’ in other 
grey areas. 
There is limited evidence that HARKing encourages the use of 
inappropriate research practices. 
8 Making us less receptive to 
serendipitous findings. 
Lack of receptiveness to serendipitous findings is caused by the 
scientific community valuing a priori prediction over post hoc 
prediction. HARKing solves this problem rather than causes it. 
9 Encouraging adoption of narrow, 
context-bound new theory. 
Even if HARKing is associated with low quality theorizing, this 
problem is taken into account in readers’ estimates of relative 
verisimilitude. 
10 Encouraging retention of too-
broad, disconfirmable old theory. 
Too-broad, disconfirmable theory will receive low ratings of 
relative verisimilitude. 
11 Inhibiting identification of 
plausible alternative hypotheses. 
The scientific publication system requires researchers to 
consider alternative explanations in their research reports. 
HARKing facilitates this process in a system that discourages the 
publication of post hoc hypothesis testing. 
12 Implicitly violating basic ethical 
principles. 
The ethical principle of honesty and openness applies to 
information that forms a useful part of the truth. The timing of 
the construction of a hypothesis does not form a useful part of 
the truth. 
The Cost of HARKing           19 
hypothesis has been HARKed, they are still able to criticize (a) the theoretical quality of HARKed 
hypotheses (too-broad theorizing, too-narrow theorizing, no alternative explanations; Costs 9, 10, 
and 11), (b) the appropriateness of the methodology for testing those hypotheses (test severity; 
Rubin [2017b]; Mayo [2018]) and (c) the appropriateness of the statistical analyses (lack of 
correction for multiple testing, lack of justification for directional tests; Costs 1 and 5). Hence, 
Costs 1, 5, 9, 10, and 11 are misattributed to HARKing when they are actually criticisms of the 
quality of the hypothesizing and data analysis. Similarly, Costs 6 and 8 are misattributed to 
HARKing when they are actually due to publication bias (Cost 6) and the scientific community’s 
preference for a priori prediction over post hoc prediction (Cost 8). 
Cost 2 is misconceived: HARKed hypotheses can be disconfirmed, and they do not 
necessarily fail Popper’s disconfirmability test. In addition, Costs 1 and 3 do not recognize that 
the act of disguising ad hoc accommodation as prediction by deducing hypotheses from a priori 
theory and evidence precludes the cost of overfitting.  
The suppression of a priori hypotheses (Cost 4) may lead to biased research conclusions, 
missing null results, and/or unreported failed methods. However, biased conclusions can be 
addressed through pre- and post-publication peer review, and missing information can be 
addressed by making research materials and data publically available. 
Cost 7 lacks empirical evidence: There is no clear support for Kerr’s ([1998]) slippery slope 
argument that HARKing encourages fudging in other areas. Finally, HARKing cannot be 
considered to be unethical if it conceals information that is uninformative, and the timing of the 
hypothesizing may be considered to be scientifically uninformative (Cost 12). 
Given the potentially limited costs of HARKing to the scientific process, it is premature to 
conclude that HARKing is an important contributor to low replication rates. However, it is also 
premature to conclude that HARKing has no costs to scientific progress. Future research in this 
area might profit from testing the potential costs of HARKing. For example, based on the current 
review, it may be useful to investigate whether HARKing leads to a failure to disclose multiple 
testing of HARKed hypotheses (Cost 1), the suppression of relevant a priori hypotheses (Cost 4), 
the encouragement of inappropriate research practices (Cost 7), the production of low quality 
hypotheses (Cost 9), and the inhibition of alternative hypotheses (Cost 11). These potential costs 
of HARKing need to be balanced against the potential costs of proposed solutions to HARKing, 
such as preregistration, in order to arrive at the most efficacious approach to scientific progress. 
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